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RANDOMIZATION is considered to have started' with the report of Fisher and MacKenzie in 1923 on agricultural experiments carried out by T. Eden on the effect of manure on the crops of different potato varieties. 2 Feinstein states, "The modem era of biostatistically planned randomized trials occurred in 1947, when streptomycin was evaluated in the treatment of tuberculosis."' Other subsequent triumphs of randomized trialsfor example, penicillin for prevention of recurrences of rheumatic fever and the Veterans Administration study of drug treatment of hypertension3 4 -led to an unbounded enthusiasm for these trials. In the 1 960s and 1 970s it was increasingly proposed without proof that randomized clinical trials were the best way or the only correct way to evaluate new therapies. This euphoric phase (Phase 1, figure 1) is predictably leading to a phase of doubt and uncertainty (Phase 2), as we recognize the many problems of randomized clinical trials, particularly those of large multicenter trials." -12 The period of doubt and uncertainty is likely to be followed by disillusionment (Phase 3) and reflection (Phase 4), until finally we arrive at a balanced perspective (Phase 5, reality). It is the purpose of this editorial to suggest midcourse corrective action while we are still in the early part of phase 2 in the evolution of large multicenter trials by highlighting some of the unexpected lessons learned from these trials so that we may abbreviate the process and move quickly to phase 5. Therefore, the expected findings and other positive findings that have been discussed elsewhere'" '5-9 will not help in the goal of this editorial and will not be reviewed here.
Therapeutic modalities: role of industry. Although ran-domized clinical trials have proved to be a great success in the short-term evaluation of pharmaceutical agents, their application to procedures and other therapeutic modalities has not been entirely successful. Industry support of studies is very important, but industry control of data is potentially a major problem and source of serious concern and misgiving.20 24 Importance of small, short-lived clinical trials. The two randomized trials of coronary bypass surgery for unstable angina provide an illustrative example. The Portland Veterans Administration Study was designed as a 4 month randomized trial from a single institution to evaluate whether "urgent" bypass surgery was superior to medical therapy in the short term. A small number of patients underwent randomization; in 1975, patient entry was completed and the data were published. 25 The results showed that "urgent" coronary bypass surgery was not superior to medical therapy with regard to short-term survival and prevention of myocardial infarction but was much better for relief of symptoms and relief of ischemia that was documented objectively.9 In the National Cooperative Study (a large multicenter trial), patient entry was completed in 1976; initial data published in 197826 confirmed the findings of the Portland VA Study. Preliminary 5 year follow-up data from the National Cooperative Study were presented in 198227 but have not yet been published, 9 years after patient entry was completed. The crossover rate from the medical to surgical therapy in this multicenter trial was more than 40%, and therefore there is concern about the true clinical value of its longterm findings. Both trials likely excluded the high-risk patient,9 limiting their clinical applicability only to patients at comparatively low risk. Thus, in certain circumstances most of the useful information can be obtained from small, short-lived, low-cost randomized clinical trials. Importance of subsidiary results. It appears likely that the Multicenter Investigation of Limitation of Infarct Size (MILIS) trial will not demonstrate a beneficial effect of interventions that are being evaluated?. However, it has already demonstrated that estimation of infarct size by creatine kinase levels correlated well with infarct size estimated at autopsy,29 emphasizing the importance of well-planned trials that increase the likelihood of yielding at least some valuable information.
Importance of hypotheses not tested. The great enthusiasm with which the results of the trials of coronary bypass surgery for chronic stable angina have been publicized has brought at least three issues regarding "'medical" therapy of angina into sharp focus:
(1) Are we administering optimal medical therapy? The incidence of various risk factors such as hypertension, hypercholesterolemia, and overweight in both the medically and surgically assigned groups in the Coronary Artery Surgery Study (CASS) was similar before randomization and 5 years later,30 suggesting that medical therapy in these research studies left a great deal to be desired; similar data are not available from other trials of bypass surgery.'0 How is it that research studies provided such a low level of excellence of therapy? It is likely that in routine clinical practice medical therapy may not be much better. Should we not be emphasizing our deficiencies in this regard and working to improve the situation?"
(2) What is the evidence that pharmacologic therapy of angina improves long-term survival? There are no randomized trials, to my knowledge, that demonstrate that pharmacologic therapy of angina improves survival at 1, 5, or 10 years in patients with stable angina. 10 It is likely that pharmacologic therapy does 450 not improve survival in patients with unstable angina.9 In fact, the secondary prevention trials (for example, the Beta-Blocker Heart Attack Trial [BHAT]) have demonstrated no benefit of the trial pharmacologic agents in the low-risk group.3" Thus, in some subgroups of patients treated with pharmacologic agents, the patients are exposed to the complications of such drugs with no demonstrable beneficial effects; pharmacologic therapy cannot be considered to be without risk. I guess the "genie" of the pharmacologic therapy of angina has been "out of the bottle'32 for so long that we have failed to notice it. Again, should we not be working to correct the situation?
(3) If the above are correct perceptions, namely that risk-factor control in randomized trials of coronary bypass surgery were inadequate and pharmacologic therapy of angina is of unproven value in prolonging life, then the possibility exists that survival data in randomized trials of bypass surgery were a comparison of surgery with placebo. 10 In view of all of the above, the extremists who state that the benefits of coronary bypass surgery can be shown only by randomized clinical trials exposes all of us to the risk of being accused of practicing a double standard, one for surgical therapy and another for therapy administered by internists and cardiologists.
Inappropriate conclusions and extrapolations. Inappropriate conclusions and extrapolations are the major clinical problem of the large multicenter randomized trials. Many conclusions and extrapolations are inap-
propriate because of problems in study design, data analysis, and presentation. 10. 34 Biostatistical tenets. Biostatisticians state, without experimental proof, that the correct way to analyze data from randomized trials is by therapy assigned rather than by therapy administered. In trials of bypass surgery that have a significant crossover problem10 (and that have demonstrated better relief of pain and ischemia, less need of pharmacologic therapy, and better survival in subgroups assigned to surgery9 10), analysis by therapy assigned results in: (1) improving the results of "medical" therapy, (2) changing the hypothesis actually tested (figure 2), and (3) reducing the clinical relevance of the findings. In clinical practice, the patient and physician are interested in therapy administered and not in therapy assigned; analysis by therapy assigned is of great interest to biostatisticians, but they do not have the responsibility of providing clinical care. Should not biostatisticians do experimental studies to prove their tenets are correct? 10 Arbitraryp only p values of ' .05 as significant is arbitrary. 5 This has been carried too far'0 where a p value of .057 is now considered nonsignificant. 36 We need to move away from such extreme positions. P values of > .5 are clearly nonsignificant and those of > .33 are probably nonsignificant, but where do we draw the line, or can we draw the line, between .33 and .05? We need to come to a reasonable position on this matter or the expression "statistically nonsignificant" may eventually lose its value. P values should be published and the readers should make up their minds about significance.37 I suggest that journal editors insist the authors provide p values up to . 1.
Theproblem ofbias. The major advantage of a randomized trial is the exclusion of bias in the assignment of therapy, and these trials are indeed free of bias at the moment of randomization. '0 However, in practice the large multicenter trials have not been free of bias before and also after randomization because they have not included many, and in some instances the majority of, 36, 38 eligible patients and have allowed a high percentage of patients to cross over in an uncontrolled, subjective manner.°M oreover, the goals of the study and biostatistical methods have at times been altered as the study progresses and also when the final data analysis becomes available.'2 In some studies, methods of data analysis follow the protocol of the study in some instances30' 36 but not in others.31 Both of these actions demonstrate additional sources of bias.
The inhomogeneity of patients undergoing randomization.
An idealized situation is one in which all patients undergoing randomization are homogeneous with regard to all major factors known to influence the end points of the study. This reduces the numbers of patients available for study at any one center. The large multi-Vol. 72, No. 3, September 1985 FIGURE 2. Analysis of results of randomized clinical trials by therapy assigned changes the hypothesis actually tested. Since 10% to 38% of patients in the medical group received coronary bypass surgery, this group cannot be called "medical group" or "medical therapy." Likewise, 7% of patients in the "surgical group" did not receive bypass. Therefore these groups should be called by their correct names, "medically assigned group" and "surgically assigned group.
center trial has been the answer to this problem, but it has the problem of uneven quality of diagnostic and therapeutic procedures between the centers participating in the trial; moreover, even the large multicenter trials have failed to recruit enough patients, particularly in many of the subgroups.'0 To overcome these disadvantages, "epidemiologic" multicenter trials that have huge numbers of patients has been considered the answer. However, in these studies the patients are not characterized in adequate detail because it is not practical or feasible to study so many patients with the more appropriate clinical tests that require high levels of skill and expertise and are also more expensive; therefore, their findings are difficult to extrapolate in clinical practice to an individual patient. Moreover, these studies also enter only a small fraction of patients (for example, the BHAT enrolled 23% of patients after myocardial infarction)38; therefore their findings cannot be extrapolated "epidemiologically" to all patients with that particular disorder without proof.
Presentation of data. In the Lipid Research Center-Coronary Primary Prevention Trial (LRC-CPPT)4' and the BHAT,38 the beneficial effect of cholestyramine and propranolol was presented as a percent reduction in percent of coronary deaths and total deaths, respectively ( figure 3 ). Percent of a percent is an interesting but dubious mathematical calculation! The actual difference by life-table analysis in the two studies at the end of 7 and 2 years, respectively, was 1.6% in cardiac mortality40 and 2.1% in total deaths.35 In CASS,36 the improvement in mortality in the surgically assigned group of patients with mild angina and left ventricular ejection fraction of 0.35 to 0.49 was 11% at 5 years and represented a 73% reduction in mortality, but the data were not presented in a manner similar to the BHAT TRIAL 3,837 Patients; P = 0.005 a. 6 LRC-CPPT and the BHAT studies ( figure 3 ). The magnitude of the improvement in the CASS was not emphasized,36 perhaps because the p value for the difference was .057. It is not unusual for investigators to present data in a manner that best supports their beliefs and conclusions. However, it is important that the National Institutes of Health not be a party to such biases; journal reviewers and editors should be especially vigilant and take appropriate corrective action. If we do not do so in a timely manner, we run the risk of building a significant credibility problem with the people of the United States because such manipulations and hyperbole will eventually become known to them and they will react adversely to the whole medical profession.
For reasons cited above, it is especially important that we be very careful about conclusions and extrapolations of the findings from large multicenter trials.'0 For example, it is inappropriate to conclude from the BHAT study that propranolol is indicated for all patients after myocardial infarction. In fact, as discussed earlier, the low-risk group that may constitute 50% or more of patients who have recovered from acute myocardial infarction3' would be at risk for complications of /3-blocker therapy38 without any benefit31 if they 452 were treated with ,8-blockers. In CASS, low-risk patients underwent randomization,0 34 and in the group of patients with left ventricular ejection fractions of 0.35 to 0.49 there were only 19, 63, and 78 randomized patients with one-, two-, and three-vessel disease, respectively.'0 Therefore it is important that results of the CASS not be applied to patients at higher risk,34 and special note should be made that the numbers of patients in many of the subgroups were inadequate to prove or disprove the benefit of surgery. '0 It is inappropriate to claim from the results of the LRC-CPPT that reduction of serum cholesterol by diet in patients with mild-to-moderate hypercholesterolemia will reduce mortality due to coronary heart disease." ' 12 Investigators and administrators who participate in long-term clinical trials have put in an enormous amount of effort and want to be recognized for their efforts. It is difficult for them to view objectively their product, which had a gestation of 10 years or more. We must have compassion for the investigators and administrators of these trials of long gestation; however, their unbridled enthusiasm must be controlled and kept in perspective. Should they be allowed to comment on their own studies?41 Probably not'2; others should do so.2. 8-19. 42, 43 Investigators and administra- Monitoring of clinical trials. It is customary for a policy board and/or monitoring committee to be set up that is supposed to monitor a multicenter trial. 36 The BHAT study was stopped because of a statistically significant beneficial effect of propranolol, many months after the results of the timolol study44 were published; therefore, time was available for thought. Before the BHAT study was stopped, the treated group could have been randomized into continued treated and placebo subgroups, which would have provided information on the benefits, if any, of continued /3-blocker treatment. This would have provided valuable clinical information about the required duration of therapy. A golden research opportunity that may never arise again was missed, probably because committees are a poor mechanism for innovative thought."1 45 In view of the multitude of problems with clinical trials, one has to question whether the formation, function, and authority of monitoring boards is adequate?
The young investigator. Perhaps the most important lesson and one that causes the greatest concern is the negative impact of the large randomized trials on the young investigator. The clinical investigator is considered to be an endangered species.45 46 These trials represent an enormous commitment of time, patients, and resources; as a result, they stifle creativity and ongoing research. They also provide the wrong training about how to do research. Traditional training about the mechanics of research is as follows: (1) formulate a hypothesis, (2) design studies to answer the question(s), (3) perform the study and collect data meticulously and precisely, (4) analyze the data, (5) present the findings at scientific meetings, and (6) publish the study in a peer-reviewed journal. The investigators then receive credit for their work from their peers. In multicenter trials, the young investigator(s) recruits the patients, does the studies, collects the data, and sends it to the data coordinating center, all of which represents a major commitment of their time and effort. Others (advisory committees, principal investigators, data coordinating center, steering committees, policy boards, and funding agency staff) do the rest. In one trial the chairman of the steering committee and in another a staff member authored a large number of publications, but most of the (young) investigators Vol. 72, No. 3, September 1985 authored none; if these "administrators" want to do research, should they not become investigators and compete with other scientists? It is worth remembering that promotions committee(s) at universities correctly assign no academic credit to the (young) investigator for being a cog in the wheel of a clinical trial and for publications that have 10 or more authors.
I am deeply concerned about another entirely pernicious attitude toward clinical research that has been germinated and is being fostered, albeit unintentionally. This is the approach of entering a huge amount of data into the data bank of a multicenter trial or of registries with the aim of asking questions in the future or just seeing what turns out to be significant. There is no study design in such approaches, which are antiintellectual. Are such efforts research? Registry data have provided a lot of useful information47 48 but their limitations (in spite of good study design) must always be kept in mind. 49 10 If a study is not well designed, it is wishful thinking to believe that computers and statistics will provide solutions to errors of study design (for example, bias of patient entry into study, bias in allocation of therapy, bias in changing therapy, bias in data analysis, and evaluation of outcomes between groups that were not identical in most if not all major and relevant characteristics at the start of the study) by complex statistical adjustments,51' 52 e.g., by control of covariates.
Summary and recommendations. Large multicenter randomized clinical trials are very useful and have provided important information. They are most easily applied to assessing efficacy of short-term therapy, particularly of pharmacologic agents. Industry control of the data is potentially a major problem.
Multicenter trials are clearly beset with many problems. They are not scientifically innovative and usually provide no real "new" information. Many recent trials have only stirred more controversy rather than provide clinically meaningful answers.' Clinical trials are slow, ponderous, and expensive.' Frequently, rapid evolution leads to obsolescence of treatments and of hypotheses that are being tested; moreover, declining incidence of morbidity and mortality often precludes the ability to prove or disprove the hypotheses that are being tested.
Inappropriate conclusions and extrapolations are the greatest clinical danger of large clinical trials, which combined with the untempered enthusiasm of those involved with the study may eventually lead to a significant credibility gap for the whole profession. Investigators and administrators must meticulously avoid conflicts of interest. Randomized trials are con-tributing to the plight of the young investigator, albeit unintentionally, which is the single most important problem of these studies.
It is better for us to think "small." We need to dissect out questions of interest and do research studies and, if necessary, perform small randomized trials to answer these questions. We should bank on innovative ideas, high-quality original investigators, and proven scientifiic leaders who continue to be innovative and productive, and let them perform studies that are of interest.
We must protect the young investigator.
The large multicenter randomized clinical trials should be considered a last resort to obtaining answers; they are needed in carefully selected circumstances and should follow the following guidelines:
(1) The hypothesis to be tested should be clearly stated in writing at the outset. It should be determined whether the hypothesis is important and that the only way to test the hypothesis is to perform a clinical trial. The feasibility of such a trial successfully answering the questions that need resolution must be critically evaluated.
(2) The final protocol of the trial should undergo the same rigorous, independent scientific review as other research grant applications.
(3) This final protocol should be published rapidly so that it is available for review when the results are eventually published.
(4) The monitorinig of the multicenter trial must be improved and strengthened. Those monitoring the trial should be held accountable and therefore must be given appropriate authority.
(5) Only the young investigators (those 45 years old or younger?) should present the design, protocol, and results of clinical trials at scientific and other meetings and should author the publications. Older investigators, members, and chairmen of policy and/or monitoring boards, staff, and chairmen of steering committees should be explicitly and strictly excluded from these functions.
(6) Data should be first presented at scientific meetings and in peer-reviewed journals. Scientific sessions program committees should select young investigators for invited presentations; investigators and administrators should avoid possible conflict of interest. "Hoopla,"45 hyperbole, and inappropriate conclusions and extrapolations must be assiduously avoided. (7) Data storage, analysis, and presentation should not be under the control of industry.
